Recent years have seen a trend towards increasing transparency in international investment arbitration. Th is trend has been refl ected in arbitral practice and in the amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules in 2006, which now expressly allow for participation of non-disputing parties as amicus curiae. Still more problematic, however, is the publication of arbitral documents, which has recently been controversial in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania. Th is paper will discuss the core provisions on the publication of documents of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Arbitration Rules and NAFTA Chapter 11. It will analyze the reasoning and the fi ndings of the Biwater Tribunal in this regard as well as the pertinent practice of previous investment tribunals. Important policy issues underlying the decision of the Biwater Tribunal will also be analyzed.
I. Introduction
Th e issue of transparency in arbitral proceedings has gained importance in recent investment arbitrations. Transparency is achieved primarily through disclosure of decisions and pleadings to the public. Also granting certain participatory rights to non-disputing parties may contribute to make arbitration more transparent. Following the orders of the ICSID tribunals in Aguas Argentinas 1 and
Aguas Provinciales 2 on amicus curiae participation and the amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules of April 2006 3 the issue of participation of non-disputing parties as amicus curiae is no longer very problematic. 4 Th e publication of documents has recently turned out to be controversial in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, 5 a highly politicized dispute between a UK company, Biwater Gauff , and the Republic of Tanzania concerning water privatization. In this case, one party unilaterally disclosed certain documents to the potential detriment of the other. Th e ICSID tribunal in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania was the fi rst to address the issue of disclosure of documents to the public during the arbitral process in detail. Th e thoroughness with which the tribunal addressed this issue is noteworthy and its fi ndings are likely to have an impact on future investment arbitrations.
Th e question of how to balance the demands for transparency against the need for confi dentiality touches on a core issue of arbitral proceedings. It is not easy to determine to what extent the arbitral process should be transparent and where confi dentiality, which is generally considered to be one of the basic characteristics of arbitration, should prevail. Before turning to the decision of the Biwater Tribunal and its underlying policy issues, this paper will briefl y discuss the core rules on the publication of documents produced during investment arbitrations and the pertinent practice of tribunals on this question.
II. Investment Arbitration Rules on the Publication of Documents
Th ere is a diff erent level of transparency and availability of documents in the three most widely used arbitration procedures for the settlement of investment disputes. Th ere are the very restrictive rules of UNCITRAL arbitration where it is often impossible to gain access to documents and where awards and other arbitration related documents are rarely made public at all. ICSID arbitration also handles confi dentiality issues rather restrictively. Access to documents is easier in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings. 
A. UNCITRAL
Th e UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 6 are the most restrictive in their provisions on confi dentiality. According to Article 25(4), "[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise". Article 32(5) provides that " [t] he award may be made public only with the consent of both parties". Th ese rules make clear that hearings are open to the public only if there is an agreement of the parties to this eff ect. Th ere are no provisions expressly addressing the publication of minutes of meetings, pleadings of the parties and orders of the tribunal. It therefore remains for the parties to decide and in the discretion of the tribunals to make determinations on this issue on a case-by-case basis. Also the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration deliberately refrained from regulating the issue of confi dentiality. Th is prohibition, which is addressed to the Centre itself only, is reiterated in Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules 9 and extends to ICSID arbitrators through declarations of confi dentiality as provided for in Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. On this basis, Regulation 22(2) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations provides that ICSID's Secretary-General shall arrange for the publication of awards and minutes and other records of proceedings if both parties consent. Th e confi dentiality obligations of the Centre and its arbitrators do not prevent, however, the publication of general "information about the operation of the Centre, including registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in due course an indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding" 10 which is currently accomplished on ICSID's website. Th ere are no ICSID rules or regulations governing the actions of the parties. Th us, it is not clear whether they are allowed to disclose any documents to the public during or after the proceedings. Basically, one has to decide whether a similar prohibition applies to the parties, most likely stemming from a general underlying notion of confi dentiality as part of any arbitral proceedings, or whether one would simply follow a literal e contrario approach, deducing therefrom that the confi dentiality of the Centre aims at precisely avoiding such obligations to incur upon the parties.
Th e most important pre-Biwater Gauff authority on this issue, the Amco v. Indonesia Decision on Request for Provisions Measures, 13 specifi cally supports the latter approach by stating that "as to the 'spirit of confi dentiality' of the arbitral procedure, it is right to say that the Convention and the Rules do not prevent the parties from revealing their case."
14 As opposed to the Centre, the parties are thus in principle free to publish documents or awards unless they have explicitly agreed upon confi dentiality. In fact, a number of ICSID awards have been released unilaterally by one of the disputing parties. 15 Nevertheless, even the Amco Tribunal recognized that "parties to a legal dispute should refrain, in their own interest, to do anything that could aggravate or exacerbate the same, thus rendering its solution possibly more diffi cult."
16 While in the particular case this threat was not suffi ciently serious to warrant the imposition of provisional measures requiring a party to refrain from publicizing information of its investment dispute with the host State, the Amco Tribunal's obiter made it clear that there may be situations where the freedom of parties to make information about ICSID proceedings publicly available will be limited. 17 While NAFTA's Chapter 11 does not contain any express rules on confi dentiality, it does contain a number of provisions aimed at more transparency such as rules concerning the information of NAFTA States about pending cases, their possibility to intervene, etc.
18
Th e lack of any specifi c rules on confi dentiality has been noted by various NAFTA tribunals which have generally concluded that parties therefore remained free to publicly discuss cases to which they were parties. For instance, the Metalclad Tribunal, ruling on the basis of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, held that:
[n]either the NAFTA nor the ICSID (Additional Facility) Rules contain any express restriction on the freedom of the parties in this respect. Th ough it is frequently said that one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid publicity, unless the agreement between the parties incorporates such a limitation, each of them is free to speak publicly of the arbitration. 19 Similarly, the S.D. Myers Tribunal, constituted according to the UNCITRAL Rules, found that:
[…] whatever may be the position in private consensual arbitrations between commercial parties, it has not been established that any general principle of confi dentiality exists in an arbitration such as that currently before this tribunal. (a) written notice of a claim that has been submitted to arbitration no later than 30 days after the date that the claim is submitted; and (b) copies of all pleadings fi led in the arbitration." Art. 1128 NAFTA provides: "On written notice to the disputing parties, a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement." Art. 1129 NAFTA provides: "1. A Party shall be entitled to receive from the disputing Party, at the cost of the requesting Party a copy of:
(a) the evidence that has been tendered to the Tribunal; and (b) the written argument of the disputing parties. In July 2001 the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) adopted an interpretation of Chapter 11 regarding provisions on access to documents and the minimum standard of treatment. 21 Its purpose was the clarifi cation of the meaning of certain Chapter 11 provisions. As for the issue of transparency, Section A of this Interpretation which focuses on access to documents is of particular interest. Th e FTC Interpretation establishes that:
[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confi dentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven Tribunal.
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It is therefore permissible for the parties to a dispute to make available documents without breaching the confi dentiality of the arbitration. Section A para. 2 of the FTC Interpretation stresses the agreement of the NAFTA Parties to provide for public availability of documents. However, confi dential business information, information which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the Party's domestic law and information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules is not encompassed by the agreement to disclose and must therefore be kept unpublished. 23 Th is Interpretation also confi rms that disputing parties are allowed to disclose to other persons in connection with the arbitral proceeding documents necessary for the preparation of their cases but have to ensure that these persons protect confi dential information that might be included in the documents. 24 It also contains an affi rmation that the governments of the NAFTA Parties are allowed to share relevant documents, including confidential information, with offi cials of their federal, state or local governments. i. confi dential business information; ii. information which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the Party's domestic law; and iii. information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules, as applied." 24) Ibid., para. 2(c): "Th e Parties reaffi rm that disputing parties may disclose to other persons in connection with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted documents as they consider necessary for the preparation of their cases, but they shall ensure that those persons protect the confi dential information in such documents. Th e Claimant, Biwater Gauff Tanzania (BGT), fi led a request for provisional measures on confi dentiality, complaining about unilateral disclosure of the abovementioned documents without an agreement of both parties to this eff ect. 30 BGT requested that the Tribunal order measures that the parties should discuss on a case-by-case basis the publication of all decisions other than the award produced in the course of the proceedings and if no agreement of the parties can be reached that the matter should be referred to the Tribunal. In addition, BGT requested that the Tribunal should also order that the parties refrain from disclosing to third parties any of the pleadings and any correspondence between the parties and/or the Tribunal exchanged during the proceedings. Ibid ., para. 12. 32) Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, supra note 8, provides: "Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." Rule 39 (1) of the new ICSID of the new Arbitration Rules regarding attendance or observance of the hearings of persons other than the disputing parties. BGT argued that despite the replacement of the phrase "with the consent of the parties" by the phrase "unless either party objects" 33 third party attendance would still be subject to the parties' consent. 34 According to BGT a unilateral disclosure of the Minutes of the Hearings would render this provision redundant in eff ect, since the public would gain access to the workings of the hearings through the publication and privacy would only formally be kept. 35 Th e Respondent, on the other hand, argued that ICSID arbitration is not comparable to private commercial arbitration when it comes to transparency. Investment arbitration under ICSID was characterized by a higher level of transparency, manifested by the online availability of a considerable number of awards, decisions and other documents. 36 Tanzania furthermore contended that the measures requested by BGT would not authorize restrictions on transparency and run counter to the clear trend towards more transparency as refl ected in arbitral practice as well as scholarly commentary and the amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules.
B. Th e Tribunal's General Observations on Transparency and Procedural Integrity
In its reasoning the Tribunal weighed two competing interests: the need for transparency, on the one hand, and the need to protect the procedural integrity of the arbitration, on the other hand. Th ese competing interests exist not only in this particular dispute, but arise in other investment arbitration proceedings as well. Th e considerations of the Tribunal therefore deserve broader attention.
Arbitration Rules provides: "At any time after the institution of the proceeding a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation of its rights be recommended by the Tribunal. Th e request shall specify the rights to be preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that require such measures." ICSID Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.worldbank. org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English-fi nal.pdf. 33) Rule 32(2) of the new ICSID Arbitration Rules provides: "Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and offi cers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. Th e Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged information." ICSID Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English-fi nal.pdf. Prior to the Amendment this provision read: "Th e Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and offi cers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings. Th e Tribunal started from the premise that parties are "free to conclude any agreements they choose concerning confi dentiality."
38 However, such an agreement had not been reached. Similarly, the BIT between the United Kingdom and Tanzania, 39 pursuant to which the case had been brought, did not contain any provision on confi dentiality.
40 Th e Tribunal stated that "there is no provision imposing a general duty of confi dentiality in ICSID arbitration, whether in the ICSID Convention, any of the applicable Rules or otherwise. Equally, however, there is no provision imposing a general rule of transparency or non-confi dentiality in any of these sources."
41 Due to this lack of a general rule on this issue it was within the discretion of each individual tribunal to fi nd the right balance when conducting proceedings. Demands for transparency had to respect procedural integrity and the interest of the disputing parties that certain information remained confi dential. It was also diffi cult to determine how much guidance or interference by a tribunal was needed during the process and how much should be left to party autonomy and their discretion to disclose certain information to the public or to retain confi dentiality.
Th e Tribunal also acknowledged that the 2006 amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 42 refl ect the trend in international investment arbitration towards transparency. 43 As of yet, however, there are only limitations on specifi c aspects of confi dentiality in Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention and in Regulation 22(2) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations, which, however, only address the publication of documents by the Centre and arbitral tribunals but do not cover disclosure of documents by the disputing parties. 44 In the absence of an agreement of the parties on which documents to publish and which ones to keep confi dential it seems problematic if one party nonetheless divulges information to the potential detriment of the other party, since this can lead to an aggravation of the dispute. Such a situation is certainly not desirable and tribunals should try to avoid it in conducting the arbitral process.
Th e Biwater Tribunal continued its examination by discussing other rules governing investment arbitration like the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules and the rules governing investment arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. 45 None of these rules contained a general duty of confi dentiality. On 46 According to the Biwater Tribunal, also the more restrictive UNCITRAL Rules did not expressly impose a general duty of confi dentiality.
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Th e Tribunal did not defi ne the term 'procedural integrity' which appears to comprise the entire set of circumstances necessary for the effi cient conduct of proceedings of which confi dentiality seems to be just one, albeit a crucial aspect.
Th e Tribunal argued that the "prosecution of a dispute in the media", in particular in highly publicized cases like Biwater v. Tanzania, could impact the integrity of the arbitral procedure.
48 Th e Tribunal agreed 49 with the considerations of the tribunal in Loewen that "it would be of advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process if during the proceedings the parties were to limit public discussion to what is considered necessary" 50 and with the tribunal in Metalclad, which similarly held that "it would be of advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and conducive to the maintenance of working relations between the Parties if during the proceedings they were both to limit public discussion of the case to a minimum, subject only to any externally imposed obligations of disclosure by which either of them may be legally bound." 51 Further, the Biwater Tribunal reasoned that the concerns regarding procedural integrity should be evaluated diff erently depending on whether proceedings were still pending or an award had already been rendered. It held that "[w]hile the proceedings remain pending […] there is an obvious tension between the interests in transparency and in procedural integrity", 52 but after a fi nal award had been rendered, "in the normal course, concerns as to procedural integrity no longer apply."
C. Categories of Documents
In the most important part of the procedural order, the Tribunal distinguished between various kinds of documents of the proceedings, i.e., minutes of hearings, pleadings or written memorials of the parties, and decisions or orders of the tri- bunal. It reached diff erent conclusions as to the permissibility of publication and distribution of these documents.
Th e Tribunal took a "police patrol" rather than a "fi re alarm" approach, arguing that its task was not to react after harm had already been done to one of the parties as a consequence of disclosure of documents to the public. Rather, it thought that "its mandate and responsibility include [d] ensuring that the proceedings will be conducted in the future in a fair and orderly manner." 54 Since there had been a media campaign fought on both sides of this case, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that there existed a suffi cient risk of aggravation of the dispute that would warrant some form of control by the tribunal. 55 Nonetheless, the Tribunal also emphasized the signifi cance of the public interest in the case, therefore determining that "any restrictions must be carefully and narrowly delimited." 56 In its reasoning, the Biwater Tribunal made reference to previous investment cases like Amco, 57 Metalclad, 58 S. D. Myers, 59 and Loewen, 60 but it found that these cases were not decisive. Rather, it emphasized the importance of determining the risks of aggravating the dispute between the parties in each instance. 61 In the end, the Biwater Tribunal reached a rather nuanced conclusion diff erentiating between diff erent aspects of transparency and confi dentiality and diff erent types of activities and documents involved.
Since the parties had already agreed upon the publication of a fi nal award pursuant to Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention the Tribunal did not see any necessity to separately address this issue in its procedural order. 62 With regard to the general discussion about the case in public, the Tribunal declared such discussion permissible under the condition that it is "restricted to what is necessary […] and is not used as an instrument to antagonize the parties, exacerbate their diff erences, unduly pressure one of them, or render the resolution of the dispute potentially more diffi cult." 63 Based on a presumption of transparency and the fact that an impartial tribunal's decisions are less likely to aggravate a dispute, the Biwater Tribunal held that the disclosure of decisions, orders and directions of the tribunal should be considered on a case-by-case basis 64 and could thus be achieved subject to prior permission of the Tribunal. 65 It also found that restrictions on the publication of a party's own documents would not be appropriate in general. 66 On the other hand, the publication of minutes of hearings, 67 pleadings or written memorials, 68 correspondence between the parties and/or the Tribunal, 69 as well as any documents produced by the opposing party 70 may threaten the procedural integrity of the arbitral process and should thus not be permitted in principle. 71 Th e Tribunal considered it appropriate, however, to provide an opportunity to the parties to ask the tribunal for exceptions to these restrictions on a case-by-case basis. 72 In addition to distinguishing between diff erent types of documents the Tribunal also diff erentiated between the release of documents while proceedings are pending and after the conclusion of the proceedings and the publication of fi nal awards. Th e Tribunal argued that the tensions between increasing transparency and safeguarding procedural integrity were only pertinent as long as proceedings were pending. Concerns regarding procedural integrity would no longer apply after the conclusion of the proceedings. 73 Th e Tribunal therefore concluded that disclosure of documents during the proceedings was problematic and should therefore be handled restrictively. Th e publication of awards, other tribunal decisions, but also pleadings and written memorials after the conclusion of proceedings would cause less trouble. 74 As a consequence the Tribunal recommended the following measures for the duration of these arbitration proceedings, and in the absence of any agreement between the parties: (a) all parties refrain from disclosing to third parties: i. the minutes or record of any hearings; ii. any of the documents produced in the arbitral proceedings by the opposing party, whether pursuant to a disclosure exercise or otherwise; iii. any of the Pleadings or Written Memorials (and any attached witness statements or expert reports); and iv. any correspondence between the parties and/or the Arbitral Tribunal exchanged in respect of the arbitral proceedings. (b) All parties are at liberty to apply to the Arbitral Tribunal in justifi ed cases for the lifting or variation of these restrictions on a case-by-case basis. (c) Any disclosure to third parties of decisions, orders or directions of the Arbitral Tribunal (other than awards) shall be subject to prior permission by the Arbitral Tribunal. (d) For the avoidance of doubt, the parties may engage in general discussion about the case in public, provided that any such public discussion is restricted to what is necessary, and is not used as an instrument to antagonise the parties, exacerbate their diff erences, unduly pressure one of them, or render the resolution of the dispute potentially more diffi cult, or circumvent the terms of this Procedural Order.
Further it is recommended that:
(e) all parties refrain from taking any steps which might undermine the procedural integrity, or the orderly working, of the arbitral process and/or which might aggravate or exacerbate the dispute.
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IV. Analysis of the Policy Issues Underlying the Tribunal's Procedural Decision
Confi dentiality and transparency are squarely confl icting principles serving competing interests. In order to assess the validity of claims in favor of one over the other it is useful to analyze these interests. Since many of the underlying policy considerations have been primarily discussed and relied upon in international commercial arbitration between private parties it is particularly appropriate to contemplate whether and in how far similar considerations are also applicable and justifi ed in investor-State arbitration.
A. Why Confi dentiality?
Confi dentiality is generally regarded as one of the hallmarks of (commercial) arbitration and usually ranks high among the perceived main advantages of arbitration over other forms of dispute settlement. 76 It is usually assumed that many fi rms appreciate the privacy and confi dentiality of arbitral proceedings because it protects business secrets and may help to protect the public image of companies when even the mere fact of litigation released to the public might cause harm to its reputation. Th e confi dential nature of arbitration proceedings may also contribute to a reduction of tensions between the parties. In the absence of the requirement to publicly comment on various procedural steps during dispute 75) Ibid., para. 163. 76) Cf. Article 31 UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings: "It is widely viewed that confi dentiality is one of the advantageous and helpful features of arbitration. Nevertheless, there is no uniform answer in national laws as to the extent to which the participants in an arbitration are under the duty to observe the confi dentiality of information relating to the case. Moreover, parties that have agreed on arbitration rules or other provisions that do not expressly address the issue of confi dentiality cannot assume that all jurisdictions would recognize an implied commitment to confi dentiality. Furthermore, the participants in an arbitration might not have the same understanding as regards the extent of confidentiality that is expected. Th erefore, the arbitral tribunal might wish to discuss that with the parties and, if considered appropriate, record any agreed principles on the duty of confi dentiality." UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e. settlement procedures, it might be easier to agree on certain non-disputed aspects of a case and thus to accelerate the proceedings. Ideally, the confi dential nature of proceedings may even facilitate settlement talks between the parties and ultimately a mutually-agreed-upon solution, be it in the form of an award on agreed terms or a direct settlement agreement between the parties.
Many of these considerations are equally applicable to investment arbitration, typically involving host States as respondents. Th e protection of business secrets as well as of governmental secrets has to be safeguarded by any eff ective system of dispute settlement. Similarly, the confi dentiality, at least during proceedings, will contribute to the de-politicization of investment disputes, one of the avowed purposes of ICSID arbitration, 77 and it might equally increase the possibility of settlement talks. In view of the typical long-term relationship between an investor and a host State, it may be particularly important to facilitate any move towards a negotiated settlement between the parties.
B. Why Transparency?
Transparency has become one of the central aspects of good governance 79 claims directed against States. Transparency is also increasingly demanded from private parties as an important aspect of corporate social responsibility. 80 According to traditional transparency demands, all branches of government should avoid secrecy in their dealings with citizens. In investment law transparency is usually understood as an obligation of host States to publish all legal rules aff ecting investors.
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While the traditional transparency demands may be primarily addressed towards the administrative and the legislative branch, they also have implications for the judiciary, requiring it to abolish secret courts, to conduct its proceedings publicly and to publish its decisions. Arbitration could be regarded simply as an alternative to judicial dispute settlement where such transparency considerations do not arise as a result of the presumed confi dential nature of arbitration. Th e better approach is to look at the underlying functions fulfi lled and values protected by transparency which apply to dispute settlement methods in general and to arbitration in particular.
Th e publication of judicial and arbitral decisions is a precondition for the evolution of a consistent case-law 82 which creates legal certainty in the form of assuring that all cases are treated equally. It thus ensures predictability for its actual and potential users. Th is will in turn increase the confi dence in the system of dispute settlement. For arbitration, it is important to be perceived as a true alternative to judicial dispute settlement. Th e special expertise of arbitrators which is often portrayed as one of the particular advantages of arbitration will only be suffi ciently appreciated if their "products", i.e., arbitral awards, decisions and orders, are also publicly available and thus open to public and scholarly scrutiny. 83 Finally, there may be a justifi ed public interest in the outcome of certain disputes which aff ects not only the parties to the dispute but either the public at large or certain segments of the public. 84 Th is justifi ed interest is frequently expressed in specifi c legal disclosure requirements imposed upon companies by national law. Th ese requirements may trump confi dentiality rules, in particular where arbitration rules qualify confi dentiality through legal disclosure duties. 85 All of these considerations are also valid in the context of investment arbitration. Th e evolution of a consistent case-law is only possible through the publication of decisions and awards on jurisdiction and on the merits as well as of orders addressing crucial procedural issues. 86 Th e public availability of judicial or quasijudicial decision is particularly important where the substantive rules governing disputes between parties are of a highly general and vague character. Th is is a phenomenon not unknown in international law where sometimes very abstract rules are agreed upon in treaties, often in the form of vague compromise formulations, which are in need of interpretation by dispute settlement institutions. Th is de facto shifting of law-making functions from the legislator to the judiciary can be seen, for instance, in the context of WTO law but also in EC law. Th e actual meaning of such crucial provisions like Article III, XI or XXII of the GATT may be ascertained only by studying the reports of WTO panels as well as of the Appellate Body. In a similar fashion, it is primarily the case-law of the ECJ which determines the actual content of the EC Treaty's rules on the free movement of goods, persons and services.
Th ese circumstances are equally applicable in the context of modern investment arbitration. Th e more or less similarly worded substantive treatment standards contained in most BITs as well as in the most important multilateral investment instruments, such as NAFTA Chapter 11 or the Energy Charter Treaty, are of a particularly undetermined and imprecise character. 87 It is only through their interpretation and application in the context of investment arbitration that fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, expropriation and other notions become workable concepts. 88 Th us, the availability of investment decisions elaborating on these issues is crucial for the development of a settled caselaw.
89 Th is will not only increase the predictability of outcomes and create more confi dence in the system. 90 Th e establishment of generally accepted rules will also contribute to the avoidance of unnecessary disputes. Parties will be less likely to resort to investment arbitration, or at least to raise particular claims or defenses, where they have to argue against a well-settled body of law.
More transparency is also important in order to create or to re-establish confidence in the system of investment arbitration. Particularly in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11, the confi dentiality of proceedings has provoked very strong criticism against investor-State arbitration as a form of unaccountable and secret justice. 91 In places where information about ongoing procedures or where awards and decisions are publicly available there should be no room left for speculation. Th e "unelected" and "unaccountable" arbitrators will have to be professional and highly-skilled experts whose rulings are open to public scrutiny. oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.pdf, according to which publication of arbitral awards would "contribute to the further development of a public body of jurisprudence which would allow investors and host states to understand how investment agreements are interpreted and applied and ultimately contribute to a more predictable and consistent system." 90) Ibid., para. 41. 91) See the famous NYT characterization of NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals: "Th eir meetings are secret. Th eir members are generally unknown. Th e decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged." Th e New York Times, 11 March 2001, Section 3, p. 1.
Finally, the level of public interest in arbitration proceedings is normally much higher in investment arbitration than in ordinary commercial arbitration. Th is public interest does not only stem from the fact that usually one of the parties is a State and that frequently enterprises providing public services are also involved.
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Since the public is potentially aff ected by the outcome of such arbitrations, it naturally shows more interest in these procedures. More importantly, the subjectmatter of investment disputes regularly concerns governmental measures. Th is often transforms investment arbitration into a functional equivalent of judicial review of governmental measures which would otherwise be reserved to the national courts. 93 In cases where, for instance, the legality of environmental or health measures and/or their potential qualifi cation as expropriatory acts is at issue, the public will show greater interest in the outcome of proceedings which may limit the future legislative and/or administrative freedom of manoeuvre.
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V. A Diff erentiated Transparency for Investment Arbitration
Taking into account and balancing the above mentioned policy considerations supporting confi dentiality or transparency lead to a nuanced outcome and necessarily to compromise. It is clear that both interests are legitimate and should be protected. Th e diffi culty lies in fi nding the right balance. It is submitted that the Biwater Tribunal's approach of diff erentiating between diff erent types of documents represents a useful and pragmatic, though not easily implemented case-bycase solution for solving the problem.
A. Awards
Practice has shown that most ICSID tribunals do in fact take into consideration the reasoning and the fi ndings of previous tribunals. Although they are not bound by the decisions of earlier tribunals, 95 the infl uence earlier tribunals frequently have on subsequent tribunals cannot be denied. In fact, ICSID tribunals are eager to contribute to a coherent body of law in interpreting and applying both customary international law principles as well as BITs and other investment instruments. As the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines put it, they are engaged in the development of a "common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante." 96 For this purpose, the public availability of awards and decisions on jurisdiction is crucial.
Although the publication of awards is a requirement for the development of a case-law in international investment arbitration, 97 it does not guarantee a consistent case-law. Th is can be seen by the well-known disagreement over the eff ect of umbrella clauses, initially by the two SGS tribunals in SGS v. Pakistan 98 and SGS v. Philippines, 99 which was continued by a number of other ICSID tribunals. 100 Similarly, ICSID tribunals have diff ered in their assessment of the scope of MFN clauses. Not all tribunals have followed the Maff ezini approach 101 which held that an MFN clause could encompass procedural questions and thus "import" dispute settlement rules into treaty arbitrations. 102 Most recently, the CMS and LG&E cases against Argentina confi rmed that confl icting outcomes may not be wholly excluded. In LG&E 103 the tribunal came to a conclusion concerning the existence of a state of necessity in Argentina diametrically opposed to the decision rendered by another ICSID tribunal in CMS v. Argentina 104 about fi fteen months earlier.
Although the CMS award had been publicly available, the LG&E Tribunal did not even mention this award in its reasoning and its fi ndings. As a matter of fact, the LG&E outcome resembles a situation which would be normal if ICSID awards remained confi dential as a matter of routine. Usually it is the publication of awards which helps uncovering and thus avoiding inconsistencies between arbitral awards. As a rule, the public availability of awards thereby contributes to an increasing consistency and predictability, potentially also if arbitrators and the public are alerted to the problems arising from inconsistent case-law. Not only tribunals, but also potentially disputing parties benefi t from the availability of awards. Th ey can refer to the arguments of the parties and the conclusions of the tribunals when making their case. Th ey might fi nd support for their own case in preceding cases brought under comparable circumstances and will be able to assess the chances of success for their case. 106 Publicly available awards could assist the disputing parties in their choice of arbitrators since they can review the past record of the arbitrators.
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Publication of awards also fosters scholarly debate on particular issues that turn out to be controversial in the fi ndings of arbitral tribunals. Th e work of legal scholars is in turn considered by arbitral tribunals which make reference to scholarly analysis in their decisions. Critical evaluation of arbitral decisions by scholars, which is also to the benefi t of arbitral tribunals, would not be possible if they did not have access to the decisions and awards of the tribunals. Th us, the availability of documents contributes to the development of the substantive standards of investment law through arbitral practice.
Against the background of this host of strong policy reasons in favor of transparency, i.e., publication of awards, it is diffi cult to see any reasons why the outcomes of investment arbitration should remain confi dential. Clearly, the protection of business secrets and confi dential governmental information may require certain exceptions to the rule which may be practically accomplished by deleting parts of an award. 108 Since decisions on jurisdiction contribute to the development of investment law in a similar way as fi nal awards, the current practice of making them immediately available seems adequate. In special circumstances, however, a deferred publication after the release of the fi nal award may be justifi ed.
B. Distinction between Diff erent Types of Documents
An important aspect of the Biwater Tribunal's Procedural Order No. 3 was its diff erentiation between certain types of documents submitted and adopted during the proceedings, like minutes of meetings, pleadings by the parties or decisions of 106) Schreuer, supra note 15, at 827. 107) Lew, supra note 82, at 228; Tahyar, supra note 97, at 116. the tribunals on the one hand, and the fi nal award on the other hand in order to assess the permissibility of their publication. Although in the past the focus of the discussion had been on the publication of awards, the distinction between documents generated during the proceedings and fi nal awards and their publication had already been addressed in scholarly writings.
109 Th e Biwater case demonstrates that a disclosure of documents at a stage prior to the rendering of the fi nal award can be particularly problematic and therefore deserves special attention.
While procedural orders as well as pleadings and minutes of meetings may contain information of potential importance to the public, it seems that the risks of disrupting the procedural integrity of the process will frequently outweigh the interest of publication. Th erefore it is appropriate to exempt not only documents revealing business secrets or other confi dential information from a potential public disclosure but also to prohibit the publication of any other information which might aggravate disputes before investment tribunals.
Th ere is probably no general level of transparency applicable to all cases. Th erefore, it would be advisable to consider the particular circumstances of a dispute when determining how much transparency ought to be appropriate. Th e Biwater Tribunal has demonstrated that a nuanced, specifi cally tailored solution is a feasible option.
VI. Legal Reasoning
It is interesting to see that the policy considerations discussed above seem to have played a crucial role in the ultimate decision of the Biwater Tribunal in its Procedural Order No. 3. In fact, the Tribunal's order evokes the impression of a lawmaker pondering over the policy choices available and then choosing what it believes to be the most appropriate solution. Indeed, because of the quasi-absence of any clear rules on confi dentiality versus transparency as regards the parties to ICSID proceedings, 110 the Tribunal enjoyed a large degree of discretion which it used in an act of quasi-judicial law-making.
111
In this context it is enlightening to analyze the interpretation technique used by the Biwater Tribunal. Th e Tribunal's starting point is its assertion that the rules governing ICSID arbitration contain neither a "general duty of confi dentiality" nor 109) Schreuer, supra note 15, at 819-828. See also Paulsson, J. and Rawding, N., Th e Trouble with Confi dentiality, 11 Arbitration International 303 (1995), 304 et seq. 110) See supra text at note 8. 111) Th e diffi culty of formulating a general rule on confi dentiality of arbitration proceedings has also led the English legislator to leave the precise delimitation to the judicial practice. While the resulting procedural order is a sensible, balanced and useful instrument addressing these issues in a striking combination of abstract guideline and detailed ad hoc regulation, it is not fully able to disperse concerns about the very broad discretion given, or rather taken, by some investment tribunals, in applying, or rather making, the law.
VII. Conclusion
Th e Biwater decision constitutes a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on increasing transparency in international investment arbitration. Th e novelty of Procedural Order No. 3 of the Biwater Tribunal lies in the diff erentiated treatment of various kinds of documents and its diff erentiated conclusions regarding the public availability or confi dentiality of these documents. Th e Tribunal's weighing of the competing interests of increasing transparency, on the one hand, and protecting the procedural integrity of the arbitration, on the other hand, is an important contribution to clarifying under which circumstances what kinds of documents could be made public and which ones should not be disclosed to a broader audience. One can therefore assume that the Tribunal's recommendations will not remain without impact on arbitral proceedings in future investment disputes.
